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I. INTRODUCTION
American tort law includes a significant strand of liability tied
to an intriguing concept variously termed "peculiar risk," "special
danger," and "special risk inherent in the work," among others.'
Both England and the United States endorsed early forms of the
doctrine in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.2 By
1935 the boundaries of the doctrine were similar in America and
England. Yet, by 1965 American and English tort law had diverged
on the doctrine. The Restatement (Second) of Torts in 1965
basically carried forward the First Restatement's enunciation of the
doctrine, reflecting the dominant American view.3 But by 1965 the
doctrine had been severely limited in England and rejected in
several other common law countries, and it remains in disfavor
outside the United States.
* Homer R. Mitchell Endowed Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University
Dedman School of Law; J.D. University of Texas; B.A. Rice University. I am grateful to
Professor Richard Cupp of Pepperdine University School of Law for his work in
designing this symposium. Many thanks also to the staff of Pepperdine Law Review for
their enthusiasm and hard work. This article benefited greatly from the input of other
participants in the symposium and from the help and good cheer of Will Pryor.
1. See infra text accompanying notes 10-33.
2. See infra text accompanying notes 34-86.
3. Sections 413, 416, and 427 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts articulate the
doctrine. For more detail, see infra text accompanying notes 21-26. These sections are
similar to sections 413, 416, and 427 of the First Restatement of Torts.
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The divergence is notable given the extent of litigation
involving the doctrine and the seemingly distinctive role of the
doctrine. Since 1965, over 900 American cases have cited the
doctrine.4 Peculiar risk presents a basis for liability different from
other standards or actions that trigger liability in tort law-it is
different from intent, recklessness, negligence, nuisance, and
abnormally dangerous activity.'
The divide between the American approach and treatment of
the doctrine outside the United States is a puzzle. In the countries
that have rejected or severely limited the doctrine, the critiques have
included lack of definition, decisional indeterminacy, and shaky
historical and normative justifications. Yet a doctrine subject to
these criticisms elsewhere has remained well accepted in the United
States in the last thirty years-a thirty-year period, as we all know,
characterized by extensive tort reform across the bandwidth of tort
law.
This article focuses on three points about this divide between
American tort law and the tort law of many common law countries.
First, this article discusses when and how the divide occurred.6
Second, this article asks why the doctrine remained well accepted in
America despite the intensity and duration of American tort
reform.' Third, this article closes with some thoughts about
whether the American version of the doctrine offers lessons for tort
law outside the United States.8 Before addressing these three
points, this article briefly explains the doctrine and why it matters.9
II. PECULIAR RISK IN BRIEF
In America, the peculiar-risk doctrine is one piece of the law
relating to when someone who retains an independent contractor
can be liable for the harms caused by the contractor. The starting
principle in this area of law is that a person who retains an
independent contractor is not subject to liability for harm caused by
the negligence of the independent contractor-subject to
exceptions.'o The exceptions fall into two categories.] One
4. A Westlaw search on December 28, 2010, in the Cases database for the term
"peculiar risk" yielded 947 cases since 1965.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 10-33.
6. See infra Part III.
7. See infra Part IV.
8. See infra Part V.
9. See infra Part II.
10. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 409 (1965). This section states the
"general principle" that, subject to exceptions that follow the general principle, "the
employer of an independent contractor is not liable for physical harm caused to another
by an act or omission of the contractor or his servants." Id. In this context, "employer"
is the term used for one who hires an independent contractor but is not in an employer-
394
[Vol. 38: 393, 2011] Peculiar Risk
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
category applies when the person who retains the contractor is
himself negligentl 2-for example, in negligent hiring.' 3  The other
category consists of pockets of vicarious liability. 14 These pockets
include, among others, nuisance,'5 abnormally dangerous activity,' 6
maintenance of highways and other public places," and precautions
required by statute or regulation.' 8  One of the vicarious-liability
pockets is peculiar risk.' 9 If work involves a peculiar risk and the
contractor is negligent, the hirer is subject to vicarious liability.20
Multiple shadings of the peculiar-risk doctrine appear in
hundreds of state and federal cases. Most variations, however, are
similar to language in the First and Second Restatements.21 Several
sections in the Restatement (Second) contain definitions of "peculiar
risk" and "inherent danger." Section 416 imposes vicarious liability
for the negligence of an independent contractor when an actor
retains an independent contractor "to do work which the employer
should recognize as likely to create during its progress a peculiar
risk of physical harm to others unless special precautions are
employee relationship. Multiple exceptions follow this rule. See id. §§ 410-29.
11. Comment b to section 409 states, "[i]n general, the exceptions [to the basic
principle of no liability] may be said to fall into three very broad categories . . . ." Id. §
409 cmt. b. But the primary distinction between the exceptions is that some relate to
instances in which the hirer himself has been negligent, and some relate to circumstances
in which the hirer, even if not negligent, will be vicariously liable for the negligence of
the independent contractor. Thus, all the exceptions in Chapter 15 of the Restatement
appear either under Topic 1 (when the harm is caused by the fault of the hirer) or Topic 2
(when the harm is caused only by the negligence of the independent contractor).
12. Id. ch. 15, topic 1, intro. note (explaining that the exceptions in this Topic are all
situations in which "the employer's liability must be based upon his own personal
negligence").
13. See id. § 411 (negligence in selecting the contractor).
14. Id. ch. 15, topic 2, intro. note (noting that the rules under Topic 2 "do not rest
upon any personal negligence of the employer" but are "rules of vicarious liability,
making the employer liable for the negligence of the independent contractor, irrespective
of whether the employer has himself been at fault").
15. Id. § 427B.
16. Id. § 427A.
17. Id. § 418.
18. Id. § 424.
19. Peculiar risk also appears as a basis for direct liability. See id § 413. For a
discussion of the relationship between peculiar risk as a basis for direct liability and as a
basis for vicarious liability, see infra Part IV. This article primarily relates to peculiar
risk as a basis for vicarious liability, although some of the criticism and case law relating
to peculiar risk apply to the doctrine whatever its effect.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 105-11.
21. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS ch. 15 (basically carrying forward
the First Restatement's formulations), with RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS ch. 15
(1934) (continuing to reflect judicial articulations of the rule).
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taken .... "22  Section 427 imposes vicarious liability for the
negligence of an independent contractor on "[o]ne who employs an
independent contractor to do work involving a special danger to
others which the employer knows or has reason to know to be
inherent in or normal to the work ....
Despite the different statements, both sections have the same
substantive meaning. Comment a to section 416 notes that sections
416 and 427 "represent different forms of statement of the same
general rule."24 In addition, the "rules stated in the two Sections
have been applied more or less interchangeably in the same types of
cases." 25  The difference, if any, is that section 416 is more
commonly used when the type of precaution is "specific," and
section 427 is more commonly applied when the dangers of the
work call for a number of "precautions." 26  In any event,
conceptually, the Restatement views these as reflecting the same
notion.
The Restatement explains what constitutes a peculiar risk:
[S]pecial risks, peculiar to the work to be done, and arising
out of its character, or out of the place where it is to be
done, against which a reasonable man would recognize the
necessity of taking special precautions. The situation is one
in which a risk is created which is not a normal, routine
matter of customary human activity, such as driving an
automobile, but is rather a special danger to those in the
vicinity, arising out of the particular situation created, and
calling for special precautions. "Peculiar" does not mean
that the risk must be one which is abnormal to the type of
work done, or that it must be an abnormally great risk. It
has reference only to a special, recognizable danger arising
out of the work itself.27
22. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 416.
23. Id. § 427.
24. Id. § 416 cmt. a.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. This description appears not in a comment to either section 416 or 427, but in
comment b to section 413. Section 413 is the first reference to peculiar risk. See id. §
413 cmt. b. This section is one of the sections in Chapter 15 that set out variants of ways
in which the person who hires the independent contractor can himself be negligent.
Section 413 is important, then, in setting out the definition of peculiar risk. But,
operationally, it is less significant than sections 416 and 427 because the latter two
sections impose vicarious liability.
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Most states follow this doctrine.28 They impose vicarious
liability on the hirer for the independent contractor's negligence
when the activity constitutes a peculiar risk, special risk inherent in
the activity, or inherent danger. Further, most states draw heavily
on the Restatement in defining which activities fit within this
category. 29  A vast range of activities have been involved in
peculiar-risk litigation-all manner of construction work,
transportation, recreation, and use of products.
In both the Restatement and in the extensive case law, the
concept of peculiar risk remains distinct from negligence and from
the definition of abnormally dangerous activity.3o Although an
abnormally dangerous activity and a peculiar risk both share some
dimension of unusual or uncommon risk, a key difference is that the
abnormally dangerous activity poses a highly significant risk even
when reasonable care is exercised.3' By contrast, a peculiar risk is
one that poses a special danger "unless special precautions are
taken." 2
An activity posing a peculiar risk, then, is located on a spectrum
of activities. Any activity that poses risk to others can be the basis
28. See Fike v. Peace, 964 So. 2d 651, 654-58 (Ala. 2007) (recognizing section 427
and noting earlier rulings stating that Alabama law is consistent with the principles in
section 416); Vertentes v. Barletta Co., 466 N.E.2d 500, 502-04 (Mass. 1984) (citing
both section 416 and section 427 in ruling that liability under either does not extend to the
employee of an independent contractor); Bosak v. Hutchinson, 375 N.W.2d 333, 339
(Mich. 1985) (citing both sections and noting that they overlap); Matteuzzi v. Columbus
P'ship, L.P., 866 S.W.2d 128, 130 (Mo. 1993) (referring to the "inherently dangerous"
activity doctrine and citing section 413 and section 416); Beckman v. Butte-Silver Bow
Cnty., 1 P.3d 348, 351 (Mont. 2000) (noting that Montana holds employers vicariously
liable for the torts of subcontractors arising out of work that is inherently dangerous and
that Montana courts have looked for guidance to section 416 and section 427 in
determining what is inherently dangerous); Kime v. Hobbs, 562 N.W.2d 705, 713 (Neb.
1997) (citing section 416 and section 427); Mavrikidis v. Petullo, 707 A.2d 977, 989-90
(N.J. 1998) (noting that New Jersey recognizes a doctrine allowing vicarious liability for
inherently dangerous activities and that the definition of "inherently dangerous" activity
"comports with the discussion in sections 413, 416, and 427" of the Restatement).
29. See cases cited supra note 28.
30. An abnormally dangerous activity can serve as the basis for a finding of strict
liability on the one who engages in it. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 20 (2010).
In addition, in independent contractor scenarios, one who hires an independent contractor
to carry out an abnormally dangerous activity is vicariously liable to the same extent that
the contractor would be liable (that is, strictly liable). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 427A.
31. One element of an abnormally dangerous activity is that "the activity creates a
foreseeable and highly significant risk of physical harm even when reasonable care is
exercised by all actors." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 20.
32. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 413. As noted in the text, section 416 of
the Restatement specifically states that comment b of section 413 provides the "meaning
of both 'peculiar risk' and 'special precautions."' Id. § 416 cmt. b.
397
of a negligence claim. And an activity is abnormally dangerous
only if it is uncommon and poses a highly significant risk that
remains even if reasonable precautions are taken. Activities
posing a special risk sit somewhere between the ends of this
spectrum.
III. WHEN AND HOW THE PATH SPLIT
In the first half of the nineteenth century, the common law in
both England and the United States wrestled with the principles that
should govern liability for the acts of independent contractors. A
wonderful case illustrating the difficulty of crafting these principles
is the 1799 English case of Bush v. Steinman.3 4  The facts were
simple:
A. having a house by the road side, contracted with B. to
repair it for a stipulated sum; B. contracted with C. to do
the work; and C. with D. to furnish the materials. The
servant of D. brought a quantity of lime to the house and
placed it in the road, by which the Plaintiffs carriage was
overturned."
Although a divided court held that A. was liable for the harm, the
judges set out vastly different principles for the outcome.36
33. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 20.
34. Bush v. Steinman, (1799) 126 Eng. Rep. 978 (C.P.) 979.
35. Id. at 978.
36. One opinion favoring liability viewed the relationship of the contractor as
sufficiently connected to A.'s work to justify the attribution of responsibility to A.
It is sufficiently established that masters are civilly answerable for the neglect
of their servants, though absent at the time of the injury committed. . . . The
house in this case was undergoing repair for the Defendant, and the act which
caused the injury complained of, was an act done for his benefit, and in
consequence of his having authorised others to work for him. Though the
person by whose neglect the accident happened was the immediate servant of
another, yet for the benefit of the public he must be considered as the servant
of this Defendant.
Id at 978 (Cockell and Shepherd JJ.). The judges opposing liability noted the absence of
control as the key factor:
Now clearly it was not in the power of this Defendant to control the agent by
whom the injury to this Plaintiff was effected. He was not employed by the
Defendant but by the lime-burner: nor was it in the Defendant's power to
prevent him, or any one of the intermediate subcontracting parties, from
executing the respective parts of that business which each had undertaken to
perform.
Id at 979 (LeBlanc and Marshall JJ.). The chief judge also favored liability but
acknowledged uncertainty about the principle that governed:
I am disposed to concur with [the judges favoring liability]: though I am ready
to confess that I find great difficulty in stating with accuracy the grounds on
which it is to be supported. The relation between master and servant as
commonly exemplified in actions brought against the master is not sufficient .
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English and American cases in the fifty years following Bush v.
Steinman were critical of the decision and continued to grapple with
shaping rules relating to liability for the acts of independent
contractors. Indeed, American and English courts were working
through these issues at the same time and sometimes cited each
others' decisions.3 ' An example is the 1855 opinion of the
Massachusetts Supreme Court in Hilliard v. Richardson.9 One
heading in the opinion was devoted to English cases in the past fifty
years: "Has the doctrine of the case of Bush v. Steinman been
affirmed in England, or has it been overruled and its authority
impaired?" 40  The court concluded that Bush v. Steinman was no
longer solid authority.41
By the mid-nineteenth century, both American and English
Id. at 979 (Eyre C.J.). The judge found some connections-though not exact analogy-
in several cases involving injury caused by home repair on the owner's property or
involving home repair work that had generated a nuisance. Thus, "[u]pon the whole case
therefore, though I still feel difficulty in stating the precise principle on which the action
is founded, I am satisfied with the opinion of my Brothers." Id. at 980. Still another
judge reasoned that the master-servant relationship did not mark the boundaries of
vicarious liability:
It has been strongly argued that the Defendant is not liable, because his
liability can be founded in nothing but the mere relation of master and servant;
but no authority has been cited to support that proposition. Whatever may be
the doctrine of the civil law, it is perfectly clear that our law carries such
liability much further.
Id. at 980 (Heath J.). Finally, another opinion emphasized that the injury had occurred on
the premises.
He who has work going on for his benefit, and on his own premises, must be
civilly answerable for the acts of those whom he employs. . . . [H]e has a
control over all those persons who work on his premises, and he shall not be
allowed to discharge himself from that intendment of law by any act or
contract of his own. He ought to reserve such control, and if he deprive
himself of it, the law will not permit him to take advantage of that
circumstance in order to screen himself from an action.
Id at 981 (Rooke J.).
37. See Overton v. Freeman, (1852) 138 Eng. Rep. 717 (C.B.) 718-19 (Maule J.); id.
at 719 (Cresswell J.); Reedie v. London & N.W. Ry., (1849) 154 Eng. Rep. 1201 (Exch.)
1204-05 (Knowles & Hall JJ.) (discussing cases that help cast doubt on the rule of Bush
v. Steinman). An even fuller account of how later English cases cast doubt on Bush v.
Steinman appears in an 1855 decision of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. See
Hilliard v. Richardson, 69 Mass. (3 Gray) 349, 357-64 (1855). Several English cases
criticizing Bush v. Steinman are Overton v. Freeman, (1852) 138 Eng. Rep. 717 (C.B.)
720 and Barker v. Herbert, [1911] 2 K.B. 633 (Eng.).
38. Examples of American cases exploring the English cases on the topic are Hilliard
v. Richardson, 69 Mass. (3 Gray) at 357-64; Cunningham v. Int'l R.R. Co., 51 Tex. 503,
508-09 (1879) and Blake v. Ferris, 5 N.Y. 48, 58-65 (1851) (citing multiple English
cases).
39. 69 Mass. (3 Gray) 349.
40. Id. at 357.
41. Idat361.
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courts endorsed a general principle of no liability along with a
number of specific exceptions. 42  According to Professor Atiyah,
these situations mainly involved the breach of a statutory duty or the
hirer's own negligence.4 3 American courts had recognized
exceptions for nuisance, injury on the property of the hirer, or an act
done under public authority." By the end of the nineteenth century,
other recognized exceptions included work done in public places
and work done pursuant to a public charter or franchise.
In both England and the United States, an exception triggered
by an inherently or intrinsically dangerous activity began to emerge
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 45 A number of
American cases enunciated such an exception.4 6 Sometimes, the
facts or language in these cases overlapped with other principles,
such as abnormally dangerous activity or nuisance.47 Still, the
notion of an inherently dangerous activity appeared as a distinct
concept in numerous American cases. In 1876, the English case of
Bower v. Peate48 included a broad statement that has proven
seminal in this area.49
42. See P.S. ATIYAH, VICARIOUS LIABILITY IN THE LAW OF TORTS 327-332 (1967).
43. See id at 328-32. Professor Atiyah reviews the English cases before 1876 and
concludes that with the exception of one case,
[AIIl the cases down to the last quarter of the last century, followed a clear
and consistent pattern. The general rule of no-liability for the acts of an
independent contractor was well established, and regularly followed, but it
was also well established that a person might be liable: (1) where he had
himself been negligent, despite his employment of the contractor, or had
otherwise made himself liable as a secondary party, or (2) where he was
himself under some direct and peremptory statutory duty.
Id. at 330.
44. A good statement of this rule and exceptions, as well as detail from both English
and American cases, appears in Hilliard v. Richardson, 69 Mass. (3 Gray) at 357-64.
The point in text does not mean that the law in the area was fully settled.
How far owners of real estate, or personal property, are answerable for
injuries which arise in carrying into execution that which they have employed
others to do, has been a subject much discussed in England and this country
since the case of Bush vs. Steinman, I Bos. & Pul., 404. All the cases
recognize fully the liability of the principal where the relation of master and
servant, or principal and agent exists; but there is a conflict of authority in
fixing the proper degree of responsibility where an independent contractor
intervenes.
City of Chi. v. Robbins, 67 U.S. 418, 425-26 (1862). Rather, the point in text is that the
general rule and some basic exceptions were established.
45. See ATIYAH, supra note 42, at 371-72.
46. See id
47. See id. at 331.
48. (1876) 1 Q.B.D. 321 (Eng.).
49. The Restatement (Second) states that Bower v. Peate marked the "first departure
from the old common law rule" that one who hires an independent contractor is not liable
for the harms caused by the negligence of the contractor. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 409 cmt. b (1965).
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The answer to the defendant's contention [that he is not
liable for the act of a contractor employed by the
defendant] may, however, as it appears to us, be placed on
a broader ground, namely, that a man who orders a work to
be executed, from which, in the natural course of things,
injurious consequences to his neighbour must be expected
to arise, unless means are adopted by which such
consequences may be prevented, is bound to see to the
doing of that which is necessary to prevent the mischief,
and cannot relieve himself of his responsibility by
employing someone else .... There is an obvious
difference between committing work to a contractor to be
executed from which, if properly done, no injurious
consequences can arise, and handing over to him work to
be done from which injurious consequences will arise
unless preventative measures are adopted."O
Notwithstanding some critiques of the holding,s' American
courts in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries continued
to recognize and develop an exception for activities "intrinsically
dangerous" or "inherently dangerous."52  Some of these courts
decided the case according to an exception involving an
intrinsically/inherently dangerous activity, no matter how skillfully
done. But other courts used a crucial variation: intrinsically
dangerous if proper care is not taken. 54 Many of the cases involved
50. Bower, I Q.B.D. at 326-27.
51. For instance, in a classic article, Professor Morris argued that the language and
holding of Bower v. Peate had created confusion about the conditions for imposing
liability on independent contractors. See Clarence Morris, The Torts of an Independent
Contractor, 29 ILL. L. REV. 339, 348-52 (1934).
52. At least a few cases cited Bower v. Peate as one precedent, although by then there
were other American cases as well. See St. Louis & S.F.R. Co. v. Madden, 93 P. 586,
586 (Kan. 1908).
53. See City of Joliet v. Harwood, 86 Ill. 110, 113 (1877) (Scott, J., dissenting)
(noting an exception to the rule that hirers are not liable for the work of independent
contractors "where the work is dangerous in itself, no matter how skillfully done. In such
cases the party at whose instance the work is undertaken is regarded as the author of the
mischief that flows from it, although he may have let the contract to another."); Watson
v. Miss. River Power Co., 156 N.W. 188, 193 (Iowa 1916) ("The work [of blasting] being
intrinsically dangerous, and, even when properly done, liable to be attended with
injurious, if not destructive, results to buildings and property in the city in the immediate
neighborhood of which the blasting was to be done, defendant could not relieve itself
from liability by delegating the work to a contractor."). Not all courts, however,
recognized an exception relating to intrinsic danger (however phrased) in blasting cases.
In these cases, the hirer of the independent contractor was not liable.
54. See Freebury v. Chi., M. & P.S. Ry. Co., 137 P. 1044, 1045 (Wash. 1914) (in a
blasting case, noting that one of the well-settled exceptions to the general rule of no
401
explosives and blasting, although some involved fire or
construction.5
Thus, by the time of the First Restatement, American and
English law in this area appeared quite similar. Although the
general principle was one of no liability for the acts of independent
contractors, a number of exceptions existed. 6 In addition to the
more well-known exceptions relating to nuisance and statutory duty,
an exception for inherently dangerous activity seemed to have
support in American and English cases.
The First Restatement included this doctrine in section 427,
which imposes vicarious liability for the contractor's negligence on
one who "employs an independent contractor to do work which is
inherently dangerous to others."5 This section's use of "inherently
dangerous" drew on a number of cases that, as noted above, had
enunciated this principle.
The First Restatement also included a separate provision
relating to peculiar risk: "One who employs an independent
contractor to do work, which the employer should recognize as
necessarily requiring the creation during its progress of a condition
involving a peculiar risk of bodily harm to others unless special
precautions are taken, is subject to liability for bodily harm" caused
by the contractor's failure to exercise reasonable care.o
At the time of the First Restatement, the phrase "peculiar risk"
did not appear in the case law relating to liability for the acts of
independent contractors. Yet this phrase was not intended to
announce a principle different from the concept of an inherently
dangerous activity. Rather, the Reporters' notes cited Bowers v.
Peate and a handful of American cases involving scenarios that
would necessarily result in harm if precautions were not taken.6
liability is "where the work to be done is inherently or intrinsically dangerous in itself,
and will necessarily or probably result in injury to third persons, unless measures are
adopted by which such consequences may be prevented"); Walton v. Cherokee Colliery
Co., 73 S.E. 63, 63 (W. Va. 1911) (in a case involving damages caused by debris from
railroad work, stating that the general rule of no liability for harm caused by independent
contractors "is subject to this important exception: If the work is intrinsically dangerous,
and is of such character as will likely produce injury to third persons, if proper care
should not be taken, the owner cannot avoid liability by delegating its performance to an
independent contractor").
55. See cases cited supra note 54.
56. See ATIYAH, supra note 42, at 327.
57. See id at 371.
58. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 427 (1934).
59. See supra note 54.
60. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 416.
61. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS app., explanatory notes (Tentative Draft No. 6,
1931). The Reporter for the First Restatement was Professor Francis H. Bohlen. Id. at 1.
In these explanatory notes, Professor Bohlen summarized cases supporting the draft
sections of the Restatement. Id. at 57. As to section 286-the provision that became
section 416 in the later drafts of the First Restatement-the Reporter's first citation was
402
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Thus, sections 416 and 427, taken together, were meant to express
the current boundaries of American law. These boundaries were not
broader than those of the English common law at the time.
Indeed, Reporter Frances Bohlen viewed the English cases as
being somewhat more expansive than American law on the liability
of independent contractors. In his preface to the preliminary draft,
Professor Bohlen noted that the draft did not extend liability for the
acts of independent contractors as far as the English cases even
though the draft had been revised more expansively than earlier
62
versions.
In sum, by 1934, after almost a century of addressing principles
of liability for the acts of independent contractors, American law
and English law had similar boundaries. Indeed, by some views,
English law was slightly more expansive in the area of liability for
harms caused by independent contractors. In addition, no American
decision cited either section 416 or section 427 until the late 1940s.
Just after the appearance of the First Restatement, a 1934
English case, Honeywill & Stein Ltd. v. Larkin Bros., 6 applied the
"inherently dangerous" doctrine to attribute liability for the
negligence of an independent contractor to the company that had
retained it. The case attracted severe criticism, both for its
application of the doctrine and the doctrine itself. Honeywill, a
specialist in acoustical work, had done some acoustic work on the
interior of a theatre owned by a cinema company.64 When the work
was completed, Honeywill obtained permission of the cinema
company to have photographs taken of the complete interior.
to the "leading case of Bower v. Peate." Id. at 66. The Reporter also emphasized that
"the principle stated in this Section does not apply unless a danger requiring particular
precautions will necessarily be created by the work as ordered." Id. at 67.
62. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS (Preliminary Draft No. 40, 1930). Professor
Bohlen noted that he and the Advisors "were not satisfied" that the earlier draft submitted
to the Council
carries the liability, imposed upon the employer of a contractor for harm
caused by the contractor's negligence, as far as it should have been carried.
The English cases have gone so far that, as was said in Halliday v. National
Telephone Co. (1898), 2 Q. B. 212, p. 218, it is practically impossible to have
work done by a contractor in a public place without being answerable for the
manner in which the contractor does the work. While, perhaps, it is not
possible to go to this extent merely because English courts have so done, the
Reporter believes that any American authority, even though in a pronounced
minority, which extends the employer's liability should be followed.
Id. at 3. Professor Bohlen then gave several adjudicative and policy reasons to support
this view. Id. at 3-6.
63. [1934] 1 K.B. 191 (Eng.).
64. Id. at 191-92.
65. Id. at 192.
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Honeywill retained Larkin, commercial photographers, for this
purpose. 6 Larkin's employees negligently placed the camera too
close to the curtain, which caught fire from the ignition of the
magnesium powder used in a tray above the camera lens.6 ' Damage
to the theatre resulted. 8 The cinema company made a claim against
Honeywill for the damage, which paid the damage amount and then
tried to recover this amount from the photography company
essentially on a subrogation theory.69 The photography company's
defense was that Honeywill's payment was purely voluntary and not
legally required.70 That is, in a suit filed by the cinema company
against Honeywill, Honeywill could have defended itself entirely
"on the ground that the damage was caused by the negligence [of
the photographers], who were independent contractors, and not
servants or agents of [Honeywill] ....
The court, however, applied the exception for "extra-hazardous
or dangerous operations" and reversed the trial court's judgment
dismissing the claim.72 The trial court's decision
ignore[es] the special rules which apply to extra-hazardous
or dangerous operations. Even of these it may be
predicated that if carefully and skillfully performed, no
harm will follow: as instances of such operations may be
given those of removing support from adjoining houses,
doing dangerous work on the highway, or creating fire or
explosion: hence it may be said, in one sense, that such
operations are not necessarily attended with risk. But the
rule of liability for independent contractors' acts attaches to
these operations, because they are inherently dangerous,
and hence are done at the principal employer's peril.73
Honeywill had severe flaws that attracted criticism of long
duration. As an application of precedent, Honeywill too broadly
interpreted earlier cases relating to hazardous activity. These cases,
scholars and later courts have pointed out, did not support a full
exception to the doctrine that hirers are not liable for the negligence
of independent contractors. Rather, these cases related to
interference with easements or withdrawal of support.74
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id
69. Id
70. Id.
71. Id. at 192.
72. Id. at 200.
73. Id. at 200-01.
74. An extensive critique appears in Biffa Waste Servs. Ltd. v. Maschinenfabrik Ernst
Hese GmbH, [2009] Q.B. 725 at 748-52 (Eng.). See also Glanville Williams, Liability
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In addition, the doctrine was said to be either overly broad or
highly indeterminate; what activity does not have an inherently
dangerous quality to it? The question had special force given the
unspectacular nature of the risk in Honeywill.
Another important factor was the appearance of an influential
critique in Professor Atiyah's seminal book, Vicarious Liability in
the Law of Torts, published in 1967.7' Though focused on English
law, the book drew on cases from other jurisdictions, including the
leading cases from Scotland, Australia, New Zealand, and a large
amount of material from the United States." One chapter was
devoted to the "dangerous operations doctrine"-essentially the
peculiar-risk/inherently dangerous activity doctrine. Professor
Atiyah strongly criticized the doctrine, which at that time primarily
appeared in frequent dicta in English cases.7 6  "It must also be
admitted that this doctrine seems to be well established in America,
Scotland, and in Canada." 7 Nevertheless, he continued, "the whole
doctrine is so manifestly unsatisfactory that one may be permitted to
hope that if the House of Lords is ever called upon to consider it the
House will reject it altogether."78 A primary criticism is "the sheer
impossibility of producing any satisfactory criteria for deciding"
which activities fall within the doctrine.79
In 2009, an English court of appeals decision, recounting these
criticisms and Professor Atiyah's analysis, stated: "[I]n our
judgment the doctrine enunciated in the Honeywill case is so
unsatisfactory that its application should be kept as narrow as
possible. It should be applied only to activities that are
exceptionally dangerous whatever precautions are taken."80
Thus, in England and other common law countries, the early
case law favoring an exception for extra-hazardous or inherently
dangerous activity drew attention to the concept in a weak factual
context, exposing its flaws and drawing influential critiques.8 '
for Independent Contractors, 1956 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 180, 186 (criticizing Honeywill as
lacking normative justification and noting that the "result of the decision ... may well be
to cause grave hardship"); J. A. Jolowicz, Liability for Independent Contractors in the
English Common Law-A Suggestion, 9 STAN. L. REv. 690, 705-06 (1957) (noting the
"much criticized decision in Honeywill. . .
75. ATIYAH, supra note 42, at 371-73.
76. Id. at 372.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id
80. Biffa Waste Servs. Ltd. v. Maschinenfabrik Ernst Hese GmbH, [2009] Q.B. 725
at 752 (Eng.).
81. For other readings to the same effect, see R.F.V. HEUSTON, SALMOND ON THE
405
Meanwhile, in America, at about the time of the Honeywill
decision, the First Restatement made its appearance. It contained
provisions on inherent danger and peculiar risk.82 The
correspondence and discussion relating to the First Restatement
make clear that the doctrine of inherent danger or peculiar risk was
not viewed as especially bold or controversial. Perhaps the
American doctrine, as expressed in the Restatement, seemed less
dramatic or problematic because one of the main terms-peculiar
risk-was a phrase that had already appeared in over 100 American
cases by the time of the First Restatement. 8 Notably, the vast bulk
of these cases were not independent contractor cases.85 Rather, the
cases mainly involved litigation under the still-new workers'
compensation statutes sweeping the country. The "peculiar risk"
phrase appeared as a way to explicate the crucial requirement that
the injury be connected to the work. 7 Thus, at about the time when
the Honeywill decision announced a controversial (and probably
unnecessary) concept for imposing tort liability on the hirer of an
independent contractor, the First Restatement enunciated a similar
doctrine that was tied to a concept-peculiar risk-widely familiar
from a different context.
IV. WHY THE SPLIT PERSISTED, EVEN THROUGH AMERICAN TORT
REFORM
The story in the previous section explains how the doctrine
gained a solid footing in America just as it was losing it elsewhere.
But, in the United States and especially during these past thirty-five
LAW OF TORTs 657 (15th ed. 1969) (noting that later cases and statements by the House
of Lords go in the other direction from Honeywllo; Gilbert Kodilinye, Independent
Contractors and Extra-Hazardous Operations, 11 TRENT L.J. 31, 33 (1987) ("[TIbe
principle of strict liability for extra-hazardous operations has thus been expressly rejected
by the Australian courts and, it seems, by the majority of the English authorities.").
82. See supra text accompanying notes 60-63.
83. See supra text accompanying notes 60-63.
84. A Westlaw search on December 28, 2010, in the Cases database for the term
"peculiar risk" yielded 101 cases before 1934.
85. Only nine of the cases from the Westlaw search, supra note 84, involved
independent contractors.
86. See Cent. Ill. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 126 N.E. 144, 145, (111. 1920)
(stating that "'[i]t was not the intention of the Legislature to make the employer an
insurer against all accidental injuries which might happen to an employee while in the
course of the employment, but only for such injuries arising from or growing out of the
risks peculiar to the nature of the work in the scope of the workman's employment or
incidental to such employment . . . ."' (quoting Mueller Constr. Co. v. Industrial Bd. of
Ill., 118 N.E. 1028, 1030 (Ill. 1918)); Schemmel v. T.B. Gatch & Sons Contracting &
Bldg. Co., 166 A. 39, 44 (Md. 1933) (stating that "[a]n injury may be said to arise out of
the employment when it results from risks or perils peculiar to and inherent in the nature
and scope of the work and its obligations. . . ."(emphasis added)).
87. See supra note 86.
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years of tort reform, why has the doctrine largely escaped the
critiques that halted the doctrine elsewhere and that have been
repeated by courts outside the United States as recently as several
years ago? I suggest that the doctrine, as operationalized in the
United States, has been tamer and less far-reaching than the black
letter of the doctrine might suggest. Two factors have been key.
First, in the last thirty years, American courts have spoken on
an issue that greatly affects the extent of the doctrine in actual
operation. The issue is whether the independent contractor's own
employee may recover against the hiring entity or person under any
of the avenues of vicarious liability. The courts have
overwhelmingly answered this question in the negative.88 This
answer has drastically curtailed the potential exposure posed by the
peculiar-risk doctrine. Many of the risks that arguably could be
peculiar risks occur in the workplace. And, in construction or other
workplace contexts, almost anyone potentially injured by what
might be a peculiar risk is an employee--of the enterprise or of a
contractor or subcontractor.
Second, especially after the Restatement (Second), the
doctrine's development ended up following narrower boundaries.
"Peculiar risk" did not mean just a risk unique to or particular to the
activity. This notion of special or peculiar was akin to the use of
peculiar risk in the hundreds of cases interpreting early workers'
compensation or other scope issues. Thus, dropping a paint can on
someone could not be a risk peculiar to the activity of painting.
88. In the vast majority of cases, when the plaintiff is an employee of a contractor,
courts reject vicarious liability on the part of the hirer. The core rationale for these
decisions is the interaction of any such liability with the workers' compensation system.
Given the exclusive remedy provision in all workers' compensation schemes, the
employees of independent contractors generally may not sue their own employer (the
independent contractor) for any negligence by the independent contractor. Rather, an
injured employee's recourse for an injury within the course and scope of employment and
arising from the employment is a workers' compensation claim. Against this well-
established system, allowing the injured worker to recover against the hirer of the
independent contractor on a vicarious liability theory seems to conflict with and
undermine the purposes of the exclusive remedy provisions. For cases rejecting the
availability of vicarious liability to employees of the independent contractor, see Monk v.
V.I. Water and Power Auth., 53 F.3d 1381, 1392 (3d Cir. 1995) (applying law of the
Virgin Islands); Privette v. Superior Court, 854 P.2d 721, 730 (Cal. 1993) (en banc);
Dillard v. Strecker, 877 P.2d 371, 385 (Kan. 1994); Matteuzzi v. Columbus P'ship, L.P.,
866 S.W.2d 128, 131-32 (Mo. 1993) (en banc); Sierra Pac. Power Co. v. Rinehart, 665
P.2d 270, 273 (Nev. 1983); Valdez v. Cillessen & Son, Inc., 734 P.2d 1258, 1263 (N.M.
1987); and Wagner v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 421 N.W.2d 835, 841 (Wis. 1988).
89. This example appears in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 427, cmt. d, illus.
1 (1965). The title of section 427 uses the phrase "danger inherent in the work" rather
than "peculiar risk," but the Restatement notes that courts use these formulations
interchangeably. See id. cmt. a (stating that the rule set out in section 427 "is closely
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Rather, a showing of peculiar risk required proof that the risk was
uncommon relative to the risks posed by common varieties of
negligence. 90  Thus, special or peculiar risk became a "light"
version of abnormally dangerous activity, not a risk that is specific
to a particular line of work.9' Dropping a paint bucket might
qualify as a risk specific to painting, but it does not come close to an
uncommonly risky activity.
These two factors have greatly minimized the exposure
presented by the notion of peculiar risk. Operationally, the doctrine
has been tamed into an avenue of liability much less significant and
conceptually worrisome than the doctrine rejected and limited
outside the United States. Given the exclusion for employees of
independent contractors, the doctrine is off the table as an avenue of
recovery for most industry risks. And the emphasis on an
uncommon risk has narrowed the avenue for other possible
plaintiffs.
We can also gain insight into the operation of the doctrine from
an insurance lens. If peculiar risk in operation posed significant and
indeterminate liability, one would expect to see corresponding
developments in the insurance market.92  Specifically, we can
related to, and to a considerable extent a duplication of, that stated in § 416, as to work
likely to create a peculiar risk of harm to others unless special precautions are taken").
90. This standard draws on RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 416, cmt. d ("A
'peculiar risk' is a risk differing from the common risks to which persons in general are
commonly subjected by the ordinary forms of negligence which are usual in the
community.").
91. For cases applying a standard that requires that the risk be an uncommon one, see
Kime v. Hobbs, 562 N.W.2d 705, 713 (Neb. 1997) (citing sections 416 and 427);
Mavrikidis v. Petullo, 707 A.2d 977, 990 (N.J. 1998) (stating that "[a] peculiar risk is
different 'from the common risk to which persons in general are commonly subjected by
the ordinary forms of negligence,"' (citing section 416, comment d)); and Marshall v. Se.
Pa. Transp. Co., 587 F. Supp. 258, 262 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (applying Pennsylvania law).
92. As a wide variety of literature explains, significant and indeterminate liability can
undermine the mechanism of liability insurance. See Kenneth S. Abraham,
Environmental Liability and the Limits of Insurance, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 942, 948-49
(1988); Randall R. Bovbjerg, Liability and Liability Insurance: Chicken and Egg,
Destructive Spiral, or Risk and Reaction?, 72 TEX. L. REv. 1655, 1668 (1994) ("Insurers,
on the other hand, are willing to assume defined liability (or other) risks only to the
extent that they find them predictable or controllable. Insurers demand a predictable flow
of future claims and other costs; if expenses are too uncertain, they will not risk their
stakeholders' assets."). Professor Abraham, in tracing the problems that have afflicted
environmental liability insurance, explains how generalized uncertainty can undermine
liability insurance:
This factor-excessive uncertainty as to the frequency and severity of the
losses that may be suffered-impedes the diversification of risk sought by all
risk-averse actors. Self-insured individuals and enterprises therefore are
affected by the problem of uncertain liability just as severely as commercial
insurance companies and their policyholders. . . . [E]xcessive uncertainty
regarding possible future losses will trouble all risk bearers, including self-
insurers who do not participate in the risk pooling that constitutes market
insurance.
Abraham, supra, at 948-49.
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examine how injuries caused by independent contractors are
handled by standard and specialized insurance policies. In addition,
we can look for any changes in the insurance market that might
indicate problems tied to this area of liability.
One standard slice of an enterprise's insurance coverage is a
policy that covers workers' compensation and employers'
liability.93 In virtually all states, employers are obligated to provide
workers' compensation insurance (in a few states, employers can
opt out and be subject to tort law). Standard policies that cover
injuries to employees contain two categories of coverage. 9 4 One is
workers' compensation; that is, insurance that covers the benefits
required under the state's workers' compensation law.95  The
second (Part B) is employer's liability insurance, which covers the
employer's legal obligation to pay damages sustained by an
93. See infra note 95.
94. These policies are standardized within jurisdictions, given the heavy regulation of
the required workers' compensation coverage. Basic workers' compensation policies
(including both parts of the coverage) are similar across many states. A majority of states
designate the National Commission on Compensation Insurance (NCCI) as a licensed
rating and statistics organization for the state. See NCCI State Map, NCCI HOLDINGS,
INC., https://www.ncci.com/nccimain/AboutNCCI/StateMap/Pages/default.aspx (last
visited Dec. 29, 2010) (showing the states designating the NCCI as the licensed rating
and statistics organization). The NCCI drafts standardized policy forms that form the
basis of the forms used in many states. For instance, the standard policy in Wisconsin,
which appears on the Wisconsin Compensation Board's website, is a form that draws on
NCCI forms. See Workers Compensation and Employers Liability Insurance Policy,
Form WC 00 00 00 B, WISCONSIN COMPENSATION RATING BUREAU, https://www.wcrb.
org/WCRB/Forms/ WC 00 00_00 B-WorkersCompcnsationAnd EmployersLiability
InsurancePolicy.pdf (last visited Dec. 29, 2010) [hereinafter Insurance Policy]. A good
description of these two standard coverage sections appears in La Jolla Beach & Tennis
Club, Inc. v. Industrial Indemnity Co., 884 P.2d 1048, 1052-53 (Cal. 1995) (citations
omitted):
Workers' compensation policies generally contain two types of coverage: The
first is workers' compensation insurance (part 1 in the policy at issue in this
case), "under which the insurer agrees to pay all workers' compensation and
other benefits that the employer must legally provide to covered employees
who are occupationally injured or disabled." The second, which is optional, is
employers' liability insurance (Part 2 in the policy at issue in this case). This
insurance "protects employers against lawsuits by employees who are injured
in the course of employment, but whose injuries are not compensable under
the workers' compensation laws." This coverage "also indemnifies employers
against civil suits brought by employees." "[E]mployers' liability insurance is
traditionally written in conjunction with workers' compensation policies, and
is intended to serve as a 'gap-filler,' providing protection to the employer in
those situations where the employee has a right to bring a tort action despite
the provisions of the workers' compensation statute or the employee is not
subject to the workers' compensation law. . . . Generally, these two kinds of
coverage are mutually exclusive."
95. See La Jolla Beach & Tennis Club, 884 P.2d at 1051-53 (describing standard
workers' compensation component); Insurance Policy, supra note 94, Part One.
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employee by accident or disease.96 Part B is tort coverage, which
comes into play only if the employee has a tort suit against his
employer.97
Another standard insurance policy is commercial general
liability ("CGL") insurance. 98 Through various exclusions, CGL
policies exclude coverage for injuries arising out of and in the scope
of employment; that is, injuries covered by workers' compensation
or employers' liability policies.99 The CGL policy is the policy that
would potentially be tapped when an enterprise that retains an
independent contractor is liable (directly or vicariously) for harms
to a third person caused by the independent contractor. If this
category of exposure proved troublesome to insurers, one might see
underwriting changes or policy changes tied to these concerns. (For
example, the evolution in the pollution exclusion in the standard
CGL policy reflects the continuing problems presented by asbestos
and pollution exposures through the past fifty years.)'00 A potential
tort exposure could pose problems from an insurance perspective
for several reasons: indeterminacy about the frequency and size of
the loss, potential for correlated losses, moral hazard, or other
factors that might undermine effective risk-pooling.
Yet, over the past several decades, the standard CGL policy has
not changed in ways that seem tied to risks associated with
independent contractor exposure.' 0 ' Currently, the standard CGL
policy contains exclusions for expected or intended injury,
contractual liability, liquor liability, workers' compensation,
employer's liability to employees of the insured, aircraft or
96. Insurance Policy, supra note 94, Part Two.
97. See La Jolla Beach & Tennis Club, 884 P.2d at 1052-53 (describing standard
employer's liability component).
98. See ROBERT H. JERRY II & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING
INSURANCE LAW 517 (4th ed. 2007). "The CGL provides general liability coverage for
businesses; individuals receive their liability coverage through other policies, such as
homeowners or renters policies, automobile policies, and umbrella policies." Id.
99. See Am. Motorists Ins. Co. v. L-C-A Sales Co., 713 A.2d 1007 (N.J. 1998).
American Motorists discussed and applied several standard CGL policy exclusions,
including exclusion d ("d. Any obligation under a workers' compensation, disability
benefits or unemployment compensation law or any similar law") and exclusion e ("e.
'Bodily injury' to: (1) An employee of the insured arising out of and in the course of
employment by the insured .... ). Id. at 1009. The court noted that these two
exclusions together reflect that "the objective of the CGL policy was to exclude from
coverage all claims-whether falling within or beyond the workers' compensation
system-'arising out of and in the course of Picciallo's employment." Id. at 1013.
100. See generally KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY INSURANCE
LAW 145-63 (1991) (exploring the pollution exclusion and its evolution from 1970
through various versions).
101. For a discussion of the extent of, and reasons for, standardization of insurance
forms, see ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN 1. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW § 2.8(a) (1988). For
insightful analysis of the standardization process and analogies to private legislation, see
Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Statute, 41 MCGEORGE L. REV. 203, 206-
13(2010).
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watercraft, pollution, and others. Some of these have changed or
been added in various versions of the standard policy. 102 But the
standard policy has never included an exclusion for liability tied to
acts of an independent contractor.
V. DOES THE AMERICAN DOCTRINE OFFER LESSONS OUTSIDE THE
UNITED STATES?
Does the American doctrine of peculiar risk offer any lessons
for tort law outside the United States? One possible response is that
the story of peculiar risk in the United States supports the
skepticism in other countries about the doctrine. Under this view,
peculiar risk has remained a manageable doctrine in the United
States only because its operation has been dramatically limited. The
range of its application generally does not extend into workplace
injuries. When it applies, the doctrine is quite similar to the concept
of abnormally dangerous activity. Thus, even when plaintiffs
prevail on peculiar-risk theory, often it is when another theory-
such as abnormally dangerous activity or premises liability or
nuisance-would have been available anyway.
Possibly, though, the story of peculiar risk in American tort law
offers a different lesson: that peculiar risk can be shaped into a
meaningfully distinct doctrine that avoids the problems that other
common law countries feared would result from a doctrine of
special risk. Yes, the doctrine is a pretty narrow one. But, under
this view, the doctrine is nonetheless a meaningful one for two
reasons. First, the doctrine captures a slice of activity that sits
between activities posing only a risk of harm and activities posing
harms that are highly significant and that cannot be prevented by the
use of reasonable care (that is, abnormally dangerous activities).
Second, normative rationales support the application of vicarious
liability as to this slice of activities. The rest of this subpart will
explore this "narrow but meaningful" account of peculiar-risk
doctrine.
We have already seen that the doctrine can capture a distinctive
category of activity, though the category may indeed be quite
limited in operation. Even granting that peculiar-risk recovery will
not be available for employees of independent contractors, these
boundaries provide a path of vicarious liability recovery that is not
available for merely risky activities and that is less demanding than
102. For a discussion of major changes and issues in the CGL over the past thirty
years, see JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 98, at 516-43.
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the doctrine of abnormally dangerous activity.
The next step in exploring the "narrow but meaningful" case is
to examine the normative justifications for vicarious liability in
peculiar-risk contexts. One important goal is corrective justice.
Although corrective justice might not generally support vicarious
liability for the acts of independent contractors, 0 3 this theory could
favor vicarious liability in the context of peculiar risks. A peculiar
risk presents a non-reciprocal risk that is identifiable at the outset by
the hirer who sets the activity into motion. "
Another normative theme is optimal deterrence, which includes
achieving the cost-justified or optimal level of activity, optimal
precautions by the hirer, and optimal precautions by the
independent contractor. 1o Several factors can bear on the
deterrence effects of vicarious liability: whether employer/hirer
103. There is no standard theory of corrective justice in tort. See Margaret Jane Radin,
Compensation and Commensurability, 43 DUKE L.J. 56, 60 (1993) (noting that there is
"no canonical conception of corrective justice"). In an important article, Professor Wells
discusses, among other issues, whether and how corrective justice can provide a
convincing theory for tort law. Catharine Pierce Wells, Tort Law as Corrective Justice:
A Pragmatic Justification for Jury Adjudication, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2348, 2349-61
(1990). Professor Gary Schwartz evaluated corrective justice considerations within the
context of employer-employee vicarious liability. See Gary Schwartz, The Hidden and
Fundamental Issue of Employer Vicarious Liability, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1739, 1749-55
(1996). According to Professor Schwartz's analysis, corrective justice theories do not
provide a convincing explanation for employer-employee vicarious liability, either
normatively or descriptively. See id. at 1754. Corrective justice would provide even less
support for vicarious liability in general as applied to the acts of non-employees.
104. This argument rests on Professor Fletcher's "nonreciprocal risk" principle as a
"medium of doing justice between the parties." George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility
in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537, 540 (1972). According to Professor Fletcher:
The general principle expressed in all of these situations [negligence, extra-
hazardous risks, and pockets of strict liability] . . . is that a victim has a right
to recover for injuries caused by a risk greater in degree and different in order
from those created by the victim and imposed on the defendant-in short, for
injuries resulting from nonreciprocal risks.
Id. at 542.
105. Professor Richard Epstein notes that the rationales for vicarious liability, though
more robustly developed today in, for instance, economic analysis, have remained the
same for over a century. See Richard A. Epstein, Vicarious Liability of Health Plans for
Medical Injuries, 34 VAL. U. L. REV. 581, 584 (2000). Still, from the 1980s on, optimal
deterrence as seen from an economic perspective has been a key theme in the law and
economics literature on vicarious liability. Key contributions include the following:
Lewis A. Kornhauser, An Economic Analysis of the Choice Between Enterprise and
Personal Liability for Accidents, 70 CALIF. L. REv. 1345 (1982); Alan 0. Sykes, The
Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis of the Scope of Employment
Rule and Related Legal Doctrines, 101 HARV. L. REv. 563 (1988); Alan 0. Sykes, The
Economics of Vicarious Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 1231 (1984) [hereinafter Sykes,
Economics] and Note, An Efficiency Analysis of Vicarious Liability Under the Law of
Agency, 91 YALE L.J. 168 (1981). In addition, leading books on economic analysis of
law and tort law included discussions of vicarious liability. See WILLIAM M. LANDES &
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987); STEVEN
SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 170-75 (1987).
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precautions are difficult to identify, 106  the ability of the
employer/hirer to monitor employee/agent precautions,10 7  and
solvency or partial solvency of the employee/contractor.'08 As
106. For instance, suppose that an employee is a truck driver who causes serious injury
to another because he is texting on his cell phone while driving. Reasonable care on the
employer's part could require training or warnings about company policy against texting
while driving. Yet the employer contends that this is regularly stressed in monthly
training sessions, and this is difficult to disprove. The employer's knowledge that some
reasonable precautions will go undetected might prevent the employer from taking those
precautions. A rule of vicarious liability, however, will correct this disincentive. In
Professor Sykes's view, this benefit is significant. When vicarious liability does reduce
loss-avoidance, "any associated inefficiency is likely to be offset by more efficient risk
sharing and by a more efficient scale of operation." Sykes, Economics, supra note 105,
at 1252.
107. To the extent that the employee's risky behavior is difficult to monitor or detect, a
rule of employer vicarious liability arguably will reduce desired precautions. Knowing
that the employer will be liable for harms that the employee negligently causes, the
employee might relax his level of care, speed, take shortcuts, etc. However, several
factors mitigate this concern. The employer might provide incentives (bonuses or
penalties) tied to safe results. Cf Sykes, Economics, supra note 105, at 1253-54 (noting
the efficiency value of such incentives when an agent's risk-related behavior is not
cheaply observable). If the employee is solvent or has sufficient assets to be threatened
by the prospect of civil liability, the employee has reason to take care. Theoretically, the
employee's incentives are reduced according to the level of solvency for the judgment.
As Gary Schwartz argued, however, the employee with some level of reachable assets, as
a practical matter, will have incentives to take care. See Schwartz, supra note 103, at
1757. The employee also might fear fines, tickets, having the accident on his or her
record, etc. Finally, the employer retains a right of indemnity if the employer is
vicariously liable, although the practical incentive this creates is unclear because
indemnity suits against individual employees are uncommon.
108. For a general discussion about how insolvency or partial solvency affects the
analysis of vicarious liability, see A. MITCHELL POLINsKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW
AND ECONOMICS 132-33 (3d ed. 2003) and Schwartz, supra note 103, at 1759-64. Lack
of solvency reduces the employee's incentive to use proper (cost-justified) precautions.
See Sykes, Economics, supra note 105, at 1244 (stating that "an efficient allocation of
resources requires the agent to invest in loss avoidance to the point where the marginal
cost of further investment . . . exactly equals the marginal reduction of expected
damages," and that the insolvent agent "has less incentive (overall and at the margin) to
invest in loss avoidance than he would if he could pay damages in full").
Vicarious liability on the employer will not directly cure this problem. Practically,
the employer often will not be able to alter the particular action or decision by the
employee. At times, of course, the employer may be able to take appropriate precautions
(such as training or directing of the employee) that would prevent the harm. Yet, the
employer would be subject to negligence liability for failure to take such precautions. In
theory, then, adding a rule of vicarious liability would not alter the employer's behavior
relative to negligence liability. Yet, there might be some safety-related steps that the
employer could take that would improve safety but that would not be required under a
rule of negligence. For instance, an employer might give safety recognitions or awards
for safe records. Cf POLINSKY, supra, at 131 (noting the possibility of internal sanctions
not explicitly tied to agent conduct, such as reducing compensation when harm occurs);
Sykes, Economics, supra note 105, at 1246 (noting that, when the principal can cheaply
observe precautions by the agent, the principal can induce the agent to take those
precautions). Even when the employee is not insolvent, individuals are sometimes unable
413
applied to independent contractor contexts, these factors generally
add up to a much weaker case for vicarious liability in independent
contractor settings than in employer-employee contexts.'o
to conform to the negligence standard of reasonable care. A rule of vicarious liability
might promote deterrence for this area of behavior because the employer might be able to
improve safety with precautions such as bonuses, prevention programs, etc. For
elaboration of this argument, see Steven P. Croley, Vicarious Liability in Tort: On the
Source and Limits of Employee Reasonableness, 69 S. CAL. L. REv. 1705, 1730-32
(1996). Many such actions might be cost-justified but, if undertaken, would not be
tenable as the basis for a negligence claim. A rule of vicarious liability would provide
incentives to take such actions.
Even if the employer can take no other steps to reduce the level of harm, the rule of
vicarious liability provides an economic deterrence advantage. When the employee is not
fully solvent, then the rule of vicarious liability places on the employer the full costs of
the activity. This arguably incentivizes the employer to engage in the activity at levels
that take account of the activity's full cost. See POLINSKY, supra, at 133 ("even if the
principal can't prevent the agent from taking insufficient care, having to pay for the full
harm will cause the principal to appropriately reduce her participation in harm-creating
activities"); Sykes, Economics, supra note 105, at 1244 (noting that "when agents are
potentially insolvent, the perceived costs of production for each principal-agent enterprise
understate the true economic costs of production").
Stated differently, vicarious liability eliminates the chance that the enterprise,
shielded from having to pay the full costs of its actions, will operate at a higher rate than
it should. In Professor Sykes's view, this benefit is significant. When vicarious liability
does reduce loss-avoidance, "any associated inefficiency is likely to be offset by more
efficient risk sharing and by a more efficient scale of operation." Id. at 1252.
109. Consider first the factor of insolvency or partial solvency. As previously
explained, a rule of vicarious liability on an employer does not directly address an
insolvent employee's reduced incentive to use care, but vicarious liability might still
improve deterrence in two areas: giving employers incentives to use safety measures not
required by negligence, and tying the level of activity to its full costs. See supra note
108. Likewise, when the independent contractor is insolvent, a rule of vicarious liability,
in theory, cannot give the hirer incentive to take additional cost-justified precautions; the
hirer already will have the incentives provided by the rule of negligence. The arguments
for why vicarious liability could improve safety when the employee lacks solvency
(safety measures not required by negligence, and tying the activity to its full cost) in
theory could apply in the independent contractor setting. As with the employer, a hirer
concerned about the potential lack of care by a contractor could use bonuses or penalties
not required by the law of negligence. Likewise, if the hirer is vicariously liable for the
negligence of an independent contractor, the hirer will be required to take into account
the full costs of the activity. The strength of these arguments, in either employer-
employee or independent contractor settings, varies according to the nature of the
enterprise. At least in broad brushes, it seems that these safety improvement arguments
for vicarious liability-incentives and activity levels-are probably weaker in the
independent contractor setting as a whole than for employers as a whole. Certainly, in
many independent contractor settings, these theoretical arguments seem unlikely to
materialize in practice. See Sykes, Economics, supra note 105, at 1246-47.
Consider the hirer's ability to monitor safety precautions. In all contexts, vicarious
liability reduces employee/agent/contractor precautions when monitoring or establishing
the lack of proper precautions is difficult. Consider truck drivers who text while driving.
This activity is difficult for the employer to monitor and thus to sanction. In addition, the
employer will be vicariously liable if the texting driver causes harm, and, generally
speaking, employer indemnity suits against the employee are rare. Thus, the employee is
shielded from the costs of the activity. Granted, the driver may fear for his job or license
if an accident happens and the evidence shows that the timing of the texting overlapped
with the accident. And the driver also has incentives for his own safety, and to avoid
harming others. In sum, whatever the adverse deterrent effects are of vicarious liability,
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Does the case improve when the independent contractor is
engaged in an activity posing a peculiar risk? For the most part, the
answer is no. Possibly, one consideration favoring vicarious
liability is stronger in instances of peculiar risk. The consideration
relates to instances when the contractor may be insolvent or only
partially solvent. In such cases, the contractor's insolvency reduces
its incentive to use proper precautions."o One question, then, is
whether vicarious liability can result in improved monitoring and
incentives by the employer or hirer aimed at improving employee or
contractor safety. Even aside from this question, though, vicarious
liability provides a deterrence benefit because it requires the
employer or hirer to bear the full costs of an activity, costs that
otherwise would be understated to the degree that the employee or
contractor is insolvent. Indeed, the hirer of an independent
contractor may have more power than an employer to see that the
contractor is solvent with respect to the harm that is caused. The
hirer can require insurance or other proof of solvency, or else select
another contractor."1 The crucial effect of this is not just a
when employee precautions are difficult to monitor, the adverse effects will be even
greater under a rule of vicarious liability for the acts of independent contractors. The
hirer's ability to monitor and sanction for lack of precautions seems generally lower than
that of employers. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 105, at 121.
Finally, consider the degree to which we can monitor the hirer's own level of
precautions. As seen above, employer vicarious liability has a benefit if some employer
precautions, though cost-justified, are difficult to identify. A rule of vicarious liability
provides the incentive for the employer to take these precautions and avoids the litigation
costs associated with demonstrating these "elusive" precautions (to use Professor Gary
Schwartz's term). See Schwartz, supra note 103, at 1760. This benefit is more
significant in employer-employee settings than in independent contractor settings.
Notwithstanding disagreements about the doctrinal and theoretical lines between
independent contractors and employees, the hirer of an independent contractor has tumed
the project over to the independent contractor. The linkage between precautions that the
hirer might take and the accident caused by the independent contractor is more
attenuated. It is less likely that the hirer would be in a position to undertake precautions
that could have reduced the risk of harm. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 413
(1965).
110. Most actors are solvent for small injuries, and even wealthy or well-insured actors
can be insolvent for the largest harms. Because actors do not know, ex ante, the injury or
judgment that will follow from their actions, there is not a "solvent" set of actors and an
"insolvent" set of actors. But, actors can form a rough sense of range of likely harm and
be conscious of the liability risk this creates for them. The prospect of liability will not
deter to the extent the actor believes he is judgment-proof. See Stephen P. Giles, The
Judgment-Proof Society, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 603, 609 (2006).
111. Indeed, employers might have fewer options than hirers of independent
contractors to ensure that the employee faces the full costs of his or her unreasonably
risky behavior. An employer could not feasibly require proof that the employee's own
wealth is sufficient to satisfy judgments for the employee's negligence. The insurance
market currently does not provide insurance products that employees can purchase for
injuries they cause on the job. See JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 98, at 515. To be
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determination of who eventually pays-the contractor initially, or
the contractor after third party claim from hirer. Rather, the crucial
effect is that the contractor, being financially responsible for the
loss (via its own assets or through insurance), will have appropriate
incentives to use care. Even if this consideration is not considered
sufficient for a general rule of vicarious liability as to work
performed by independent contractors, it could bolster the case for
vicarious liability in pockets of activity involving peculiar risk.
The goal of cost-spreading is also important in analyzing
vicarious liability. Effective loss-spreading reduces the costs of the
inevitable harms because, when spread effectively, the costs of a
given accident are less dislocating and burdensome than when borne
entirely by one actor. The consideration of cost spreading tends to
favor vicarious liability for employers rather than only personal
liability for employees. In general, employers are better self-
insurers or better able to obtain insurance than employees. This
consideration does not support vicarious liability for independent
contractors.
This conclusion does not change when we posit that the
contractor is involved in a peculiarly risky activity. First, in many
situations, the independent contractor is almost certainly the better
cost-spreader. These situations include contractors for infrequent or
intermittent services not closely tied to the individual's or small
business's expertise (e.g., taxi service, cleaning service, yard
service, nighttime private security service, or package delivery
service). It also includes contractors within the same general area
of enterprise whose work represents a specialty or subcategory of
the enterprise (e.g., independent diagnostic laboratories,
construction subcontractors). From an insurance perspective,
liability insurance would be available to all these contractors. More
importantly, liability insurance provided along contractor lines
would generally be more efficient than liability insurance provided
according to enterprises.
VI. CONCLUSION
Throughout the nineteenth century, both American and English
courts recognized a doctrine of peculiar risk as one of several
avenues for tort recovery against the hirers of independent
sure, this probably stems from the structure of current liability rules. Because the
employer is vicariously liable, the employer's CGL coverage includes coverage for harms
caused by the employees. See id. at 517. The incentives do not exist, in the insurance
market, for insurance purchased by the individual insured and covering his or her job-
related torts. By contrast, the insurance market for independent contractors is robust, and
those who retain independent contractors can ascertain whether the contractor has
adequate wealth or insurance coverage. See supra notes 91-102 and accompanying text.
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contractors. Yet, after the First Restatement enunciated the doctrine
in a form that was thought to be no broader than the English
doctrine, the doctrine fell into disfavor in England, even as litigation
in America solidified the doctrine. The specific avenues of English
and American litigation in this area help explain why reaction
turned negative in England, but not in America, in the years
between the First and Second Restatements. A bigger puzzle is why
this avenue of recovery, whose breadth and indeterminacy spelled
its disfavor elsewhere, retained a solid hold in American tort law
throughout years of tort reform activity in America.
This article posits that the doctrine persisted without much
controversy in America because the doctrine evolved to capture a
specific and narrow category of activity on the spectrum between
ordinarily risky activities and abnormally dangerous activities.
Further, during the last forty years, and for reasons not specific to
the peculiar-risk theory, the doors of vicarious liability recovery
firmly closed shut on one category of potential victims most likely
to bring serious lawsuits on the basis of this theory-employees of
independent contractors.
At this point, neither American tort law nor tort law outside the
United States has much new to learn from the other's experiences
with the peculiar-risk doctrine. American peculiar-risk doctrine has
already developed in a way that avoids the serious critiques that the
doctrine attracted in England. Conversely, the American law of
peculiar risk suggests a lesson that the peculiar-risk doctrine need
not become unbounded and indeterminate. The case for this
doctrine, and its practical reach, however, are probably too minimal
to cause any change of course in tort law elsewhere.
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